Dangerous Driving Written by: Chris Smith, PNLD's Traffic Law Consultant

Not reviewed after the date of publication - 25 April 2024

Chris Smith, PNLD’s traffic law consultant, has created this overview of dangerous driving, including the main provisions of the legislation, useful outlines of the key terms, relevant caselaw judgments and links to related guidance. These have been set out in the pertinent questions and answers below, which provide notable legal points in relation to this topic.

What is dangerous driving?

Section 2A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988) states that for the purposes of sections 1, 1A and 2, a person drives dangerously if:

‘(a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be dangerous (section 2A(1)).’

However, note the different standard for designated persons (driving for policing purposes), under subsection (1B), who are deemed to be driving dangerously if:

‘(a) the way the person drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful constable who has undertaken the same prescribed training, and
(b) it would be obvious to such a competent and careful constable that driving in that way would be dangerous.’

Additionally, dangerous driving may occur under section 2A(2), which provides that:

‘A person is also to be regarded as driving dangerously for the purposes of sections 1, 1A and 2 above if it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous.’

Dangerous refers to either danger of injury to any person or danger of serious damage to property. In determining for the purposes of those subsections what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful driver or constable (as the case may be) in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused (section 2A(3)).

In determining the state of the vehicle for the purposes of subsection (2) above, regard may be had to anything attached to or carried on or in it and to the manner in which it is attached or carried (section 2A(4)).

Who is a ‘competent and careful driver’?

When examining the standard of driving, an objective (ordinary person) test is used. Previously, phrases such as ‘the man on the Clapham omnibus’ and more recently, ‘the man/woman on the North Circular’ i.e. the ordinary person, have been used to convey this. 

The standard of driving must be shown to have fallen far below the standard of a competent and careful driver. The person’s driving should be judged in absolute terms, taking no account of age, experience etc. but such factors are relevant when sentencing. 

What is meant by ‘far below'?

This is best illustrated by reference to stated cases. In R v Conteh [2004] RTR 1, it was rush-hour, the road was very busy, but the weather was good and it was daylight. A driver moved into a 24-hour bus lane on his left (where there was no traffic), just before a pelican crossing, so as to turn left a short distance after the crossing. A van blocked his view of the right-hand side of the crossing and so he didn’t see two pedestrians, who had been signalled to cross by the van driver (the traffic lights were green for vehicles). Even though the driver was only travelling at 20 mph, the collision proved fatal for one of the pedestrians. The driver was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. On appeal by the driver, allowing the appeal, the court stated:

  • ‘it was important in a case which charged the causing of death by dangerous driving, and when the issue was whether the driving was dangerous, to keep firmly in mind, however tragic the outcome, the high threshold that section 2A RTA 1988 established for the commission of the offence;
  • that, in the defendant's case, whether the circumstances were taken in combination or individually and in combination, the case for the prosecution, at its highest, was well below the statutory threshold, and, if the pedestrian had not died it was unlikely that the prosecution would have considered a charge of dangerous driving...
  • Where one or more provisions of the Highway Code are in play, it would be wise for the judge expressly to warn the jury that mere breach of the Code does not of itself constitute the offence with which they are concerned.’

Conversely, in R v Collins (Lezlie) [1997] RTR 439, a grade one police advanced driver was following a stolen car travelling at high speed. The police driver crossed a junction against a red light at nearly 100 mph with no visibility of the road entering the junction from his left. He did this in the belief that the junction was being controlled by other police officers because:

  • of his knowledge of police practices;
  • police had been controlling traffic at two previous junctions;
  • there was a police car with flashing lights at the junction; and
  • there was an apparent absence of traffic at the junction on his approach.

On driving through the junction, the officer’s police car collided with another vehicle, killing its driver and the observer (passenger) in the police car. The officer was convicted and sentenced to concurrent terms of three months' imprisonment on each count and disqualified for driving for two years. On appeal, the officer’s convictions on two counts of causing death by dangerous driving were upheld. The court stated ‘… it is the duty of this court to stand back and look, overall, at the seriousness of these two convictions. They both arise out of the same course of driving. It was a fast speed on a road governed by a number of sets of traffic lights. It may have been an error of judgment, but it was a very serious error of judgment, and it brought to an abrupt end the lives of two totally innocent people. In the view of this court sympathy has to be put on one side, and these facts have to be looked at with a hard objective look’. An offender’s belief, whether genuine or not, isn’t a relevant factor.

Does dangerous driving include unintentional acts?

In the Attorney General’s Reference (No.4 of 2000), a bus driver unintentionally pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, killing two pedestrians, the Court of Appeal held:

  • There were two parts to the definition of ‘dangerous driving’ in section 2A:
    • The standard of driving had to fall far below that of a careful and competent driver, and 
    • it would be obvious to a careful and competent driver that driving in such a manner would be dangerous.
  • The parts set out a wholly objective test and did not require any specific intent to drive dangerously. 
  • It’s for the jury to determine what constitutes dangerous driving.
  • The movements of the defendant were not involuntary, flowing from an exercise of his will which was gravely affected by his belief that he was pressing the brake.
  • Unintentionally pressing the accelerator instead of the brake was no defence to a charge of dangerous driving under section 1 RTA 1988.

However, if an offence is due to a mistake, this can go towards mitigation.

Does dangerous driving apply to drivers who know they have a medical condition?

In R v Marison (1996), a diabetic driver drove his vehicle knowing there was a real chance that he would have a sudden hypoglycaemic attack that could occur without warning. The driver had such an attack, which resulted in a head-on collision with another vehicle, killing its driver. It was held that the driver’s awareness he was likely to have hypoglycaemic attacks without warning constituted ‘circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused’ (section 2A(3)). He was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving.

Does dangerous driving apply to drivers who have taken drugs or drunk alcohol?

In R v Pleydell (2005), a driver lost control of his car and collided with a parked vehicle, causing the death of his passenger. The driver was tested approximately three hours after the accident and traces of cocaine were found in his blood. The evidence was admitted at trial and a forensic toxicologist said it indicated the driver had taken the drug shortly before the incident and it could have impaired his driving ability. The driver argued there had been no evidence as to the quantity of cocaine he had taken or expert opinion as to the actual impact on his driving rather than the potential impact; therefore the evidence that he had taken cocaine was prejudicial and inadmissible. Dismissing the appeal the court stated, ‘the jury was entitled to view the consumption of the cocaine per se (by or in itself) as relevant to the issue of driving dangerously, in contrast to perhaps modest consumption of alcohol’. 

In R v Webster (2006), the Court of Appeal held that whilst evidence that a driver had been drinking was relevant and admissible, it didn’t determine whether their driving was dangerous as defined by section 2A RTA 1988.

What does the phrase ‘obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous’ mean?

In R v Strong (1994), the underside of a recently bought second hand car was so badly corroded that it made the vehicle dangerous, but the defendant was unaware of this because the corrosion was only visible from underneath. The court held that the corrosion would not have been ‘obvious’ to a competent and careful driver. They referred to the definition of ‘obvious’ given in the Oxford Dictionary, i.e. ‘seen or realised at first glance, evident’. 

The definition of obviousness applied in R v Strong, above, was used by the Court of Appeal in R v Roberts and George [1997] RTR 462. George was driving a tipper truck (owned by Roberts) on a motorway when the rear nearside wheel came off, bounced over the central reservation and hit a car, killing the driver instantly. Both appellants were charged with causing death by dangerous driving. Allowing the appeals, the court stated:

  • ‘a driver was not guilty of an offence under sections 1 and 2A(2) RTA 1988, unless it was, or should have been obvious in the sense that it could have been seen or realised at first glance, evident to him, if he was being careful and competent, that it was dangerous to drive the vehicle in its current state; 
  • an employed driver was not to be expected to do more by way of inspection than he was instructed to do, unless he should have appreciated that his instructions were inadequate;
  • in the absence of proper directions to the jury about what facts had to be proved before conviction was possible, the conviction of an employed driver who had complied with his employer's instructions in relation to checking wheels, nuts and tyres on his lorry, could not be sustained; 
  • since it was not possible for a secondary party to be guilty unless the principal offender was convicted, the appeal of the owner/operator also succeeded.’

In relation to R v Strong, the court in Roberts and George also stated:

‘That case involved corrosion in a second-hand car recently purchased by the appellant and the court said that an ordinary motorist would not be expected to check for corrosion under the vehicle. But more might be expected, depending on the circumstances, of a professional driver such as a P.S.V. or H.G.V. driver. Regard would always have to be had to the particular circumstances. Furthermore, what might be obvious to, for example, a trained mechanic, who was accustomed to doing all his own maintenance and repair work, might not be obvious to an ordinary unskilled motorist. Nevertheless, in each case it would have to be obvious in the Strong sense that to drive the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous because of the relevant defect.’

Does dangerous driving under section 2A(2) cover danger resulting from the design of a vehicle?

In R v Marchant; R. v Muntz (2003), a farmer employed a tractor driver who was driving a loading machine, on a road, that had a boom and grab with large forward pointing spikes on the front. Whilst positioned correctly to turn into a farm entrance with the boom in the position recommend by the manufacturer for road use, a motorcyclist, travelling at speed in the opposite direction, collided with the grab and was killed. The defendants were charged with causing death by dangerous driving. The loading machine had been bought from a reputable dealer and was specifically authorised by the Secretary of State under section 44(1) RTA 1988 for use on public roads so section 40A RTA 1988 (use of vehicle in dangerous condition) didn’t apply, but this was not the case in relation to section 2A(2) (causing death by dangerous driving), on the basis that it would be obvious to a careful and competent driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous. Allowing the appeals and quashing the convictions, the court stated:

  • ‘even where a vehicle fell within the category of vehicles authorised by the Secretary of State for use on the road, so that section 40A RTA 1988 was disapplied, it would nonetheless be appropriate to prosecute, under sections 1 or 2 of the Act, a driver who had so manoeuvred the vehicle as to create a danger additional to that created by the mere presence of the vehicle on the road;
  • … the exemption from prosecution under section 40A, provided by section 44, did not provide a defence to a prosecution under section 1; 
  • … the term ‘current state of the vehicle’ in section 2A(2) implied a state different from the original or manufactured state; 
  • and that, accordingly, as the alleged obvious dangerous condition of the vehicle stemmed purely from its inherent design rather than from lack of maintenance or positive alteration, the defendants should not have been prosecuted on the basis that the ‘current state’ of the vehicle was dangerous.’

Would having an insecure load amount to dangerous driving?


Section 2A(4) RTA 1988 states that in determining for the purposes of section 2A(2) the state of a vehicle, regard may be had to anything attached to or carried on or in it and to the manner in which it is attached or carried. As an example, in R v Crossman [1986] RTR 49, a driver was convicted of causing death by reckless driving when his load fell off and killed a pedestrian – he decided to drive the vehicle whilst aware there was a risk of the load falling off and killing/injuring another road user.

Are there any new provisions in relation to dangerous driving for police drivers?


The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 introduced a new test to assess the standard of driving of a police officer – see HOC 009/2022.

Additionally, CPS have published guidance in relation to dangerous driving – see in particular the section headed ‘Factors that are not relevant in deciding whether driving is dangerous or careless’.
 

How have the courts viewed incidents involving police drivers?


In DPP v Milton [2006] RTR 21, a grade one advanced police driver was assigned a new high-powered vehicle he was unfamiliar with, so he decided to practice his skills as he had been told in police training. The weather was fine and there was hardly any traffic about. He travelled at speeds of 149mph on a motorway and 91mph in a 30mph limit without giving warning to other road users but there was no evidence that other road users had been endangered by his driving, which was of a high standard. He was charged with dangerous driving and five alternative offences of exceeding the speed limit. The district judge dismissed all charges on the basis that the defendant's driving did not fall below the standard expected of a competent and capable driver and that, in exceeding the speed limit, the defendant was driving for police purposes in accordance with section 87 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. 

On appeal by the prosecutor, allowing the appeal, the court held:
  • ‘under section 2A RTA 1988 the test of whether driving was dangerous for the purposes of section 2 was to be judged objectively as being what would have been obvious to the independent bystander; 
  • but that, in considering whether the defendant's driving was dangerous, the district judge appeared to have taken into account in the defendant's favour the defendant's own knowledge of his driving skills;
  • that, in so far as the district judge thereby imported a subjective element into the test of dangerous driving which he applied, he was wrong in law to do so; 
  • that, further, it was a failing on the part of the district judge not to have taken into account the effect on other road users of somebody coming up behind them, or across their path, at speeds of the kind at which the defendant was driving and with no warning; 
  • that, while speed alone was not sufficient to found a conviction for dangerous driving, driving at the speeds attained by the defendant on public roads without any warning, however good and however skilled the driver, amounted to a prima facie (on the face of it) case of dangerous driving …’
In R v Bannister (2009), an experienced police traffic officer was driving in the dark on a motorway at 113mph during very heavy rain with a lot of surface water. The car aquaplaned, spun out of control, and crashed into trees at the side of the motorway. The officer received only minor injuries, but the car was very badly damaged. At his trial on a charge of dangerous driving, the officer’s case was that his training as an advanced driver had given him special skills that enabled him to drive safely at higher speeds than the ordinary competent and careful driver. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 weeks imprisonment. The officer appealed against his conviction on the grounds that the judge’s summing up didn’t make clear the way in which the test of dangerous driving, as set out in the statute, was applied. Allowing the appeal, the court said:
  • ‘that if the special skill of the driver were to be taken into account in assessing whether a defendant's driving was dangerous then it had inevitably to follow that the standard being applied was that of the driver with special skills, which was inconsistent with the test of the competent and careful driver set out in section 2A RTA 1988;
  • that, therefore, any special skill, or lack of skill, of the driver was an irrelevant circumstance when considering whether his driving was ‘dangerous for the purposes of section 2;
  • but that, while the judge had been incorrect in summing up on a basis more favourable to the defendant, there was a real and substantial risk that he had summed up in a way which would have confused the jury and which did not provide a proper basis for a safe conviction for dangerous driving; 
  • and that, accordingly, the conviction of dangerous driving would be quashed, and, given no useful purpose would be served by a retrial where the defendant had already served a prison sentence, a conviction of careless driving would be substituted.’
 

Is the Highway Code applicable when dealing with dangerous driving?


Section 38(7) RTA 1988 deals with the legal significance of the Highway Code. In relation to this, CPS state ‘Prosecutors should also consider whether a driver has failed to observe a provision of the Highway Code. This does not itself render that person liable to criminal proceedings, but a failure, particularly a serious one, may constitute evidence of careless or even dangerous driving’.
 

Final words


As can be seen from this article, although legislation provides for this offence, the situations involved and can be varied, and the caselaw is numerous. The precedents set by the cases in relation to, but not limited to, drink and drugs, police officer driving, medical conditions and what constitutes dangerous driving, should be noted in order to get a full overview of the offence and the likely considerations of the Courts. Further information can be found in HOC 009/2022 and the CPS guidance.

Want more of this type of content? Check out our range of legal articles here.