Carter v The Chief Constable of Essex Police 2025
C was arrested following an altercation in a pub. When presented to the custody officer to consider his detention, C was agitated - refusing to answer questions relating to a risk assessment. During this, C was directed or, pushed face down onto the custody desk (referred to as phase 1). C subsequently turned to the officers and raised his hands, which were handcuffed to the front. As such, officers took C to the floor during which, C bit one officer’s hand. C’s handcuffs were moved to the rear and leg restraints were applied. The custody officer instructed C to be taken straight to a cell. Officers carried C to cell 28, forcibly removing C's clothing by cutting them off - given his refusal to complete the risk assessment (referred to as phase 2). Feathers had littered the cell after C's coat was cut from him therefore, C was moved from cell 28 to cell 26. C was left naked but with a self-harm suit to use if he wished. Officers had inadvertently left a latex glove in C's cell. C was obstructive over returning this to officers so, officers entered the cell to retrieve it. Force in the form of blows to C's arm were used to recover the item (referred to as phase 3). During this, C had struck his head on a wall. C subsequently attended hospital for assessment.
C commenced proceedings against the Chief Constable of Essex Police - claiming assault and battery in respect of the various uses of force to which he was subjected. This included:
(1) at the custody desk (phase 1)
(2) in Cell 28 (phase 2)
(3) in Cell 26 (phase 3)
(2) in Cell 28 (phase 2)
(3) in Cell 26 (phase 3)
C claimed damages for physical and psychiatric injuries, injury to his feelings, special damages, and aggravated and exemplary damages.
The Chief Constable defended the claim in its entirety.
The initial Recorder found the force in phase 1 and 3 was lawful. However, the force used to remove C's clothing in phase 2 was not lawful under section 54 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Sub-section (4)(a) of that section states “clothing and personal effects may only be seized if the custody officer …. believes that the person from whom they are seized may use them …. to cause physical injury to himself or another person”. The Recorder held there was no reasonable basis for any belief C might use his clothing to self-harm and officers should have paused and reflected to consider the appropriate action.
C subsequently appealed.
Held
Appeal dismissed.
The court considered the meaning of section 54(4)(a) and whether the custody officer's relevant belief had to be not only genuine but, also based on reasonable grounds.
The court determined that as a matter of plain language, there was no qualification to the custody officer's requisite belief. The custody officer simply had to hold the relevant belief. The word "reasonably" did not appear in legislation and it could not be implied in circumstances where the qualification of reasonableness did not appear expressly elsewhere in PACE, including in section 54(4) itself. It was clear Parliament was careful to distinguish between situations where a power could be exercised on the basis of belief, and those that depended on the existence of reasonable grounds for belief. The omission of a criterion of reasonableness in section 54(4)(a) could only be concluded as a deliberate decision by Parliament. That was not to say the question of reasonableness could not be relevant to an assessment of whether, as a matter of fact, the custody officer actually held the necessary belief, but reasonable belief was not an independent requirement. This interpretation is consistent with Zander on PACE, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 9th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2023), para.5-03.
Therefore, the appellate judge found the removal of C’s clothing at phase 2 was justified under the circumstances of his detention.
View the full case document here, with links to related legislation and similar cases.
