Correct on the date of publication - 27 April 2026
Question:
A number of offences in the Public Order Act 1986 make reference to the use of "insulting words or behaviour". What might be regarded as "insulting" for the purpose of the offence?
Answer:
This question was central to the case of Brutus v Cozens (1972) which provides the authority for the proposition that ordinary everyday words in everyday usage must be given their ordinary everyday meanings.
The 1971 Wimbledon Championships were disrupted by a political demonstration staged by Denis Brutus. During a match Brutus blew a whistle and commenced an anti-apartheid protest. Immediately after the whistle was blown, Brutus was joined on court by nine or ten other demonstrators waving banners and placards.
Some of the spectators made known their disquiet at Brutus' conduct by shouting at him, gesticulating and shaking their fists. Some attempted to strike him as he was escorted from the court by the police. The demonstration lasted a couple of minutes or so.
Brutus appeared before the magistrates' court where he pleaded 'not guilty' to a charge alleging that he had used insulting behaviour whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned, contrary to the then section 5 of the then Public Order Act 1936. The defence submitted that there was no case to answer and, the magistrates dismissed the information on the grounds that his conduct was not 'insulting'.
The prosecutor appealed to the Divisional Court, who, in allowing the appeal, held that behaviour which affronted other people and evidenced a disrespect or contempt for their rights, including behaviour which reasonable persons would foresee was likely to cause the resentment or protest, which had occurred in the instant case, was insulting behaviour. The court remitted the hearing to the magistrates' court with a direction that they should continue the hearing, but also certified that a point of law, their interpretation of the word 'insulting', was of general public importance; thus facilitating an appeal to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords unanimously agreed that the Divisional Court had approached the case on the wrong basis by attempting to give, as a matter of law, a meaning to a word. The House of Lords held that the meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. "Such ordinary words must be given their ordinary meaning" it was stated, and whether something was "insulting" was a question, not of law, but of fact, for the magistrates to decide". The judgment of the House of Lords records that the Appeal Courts should resist the temptation to substitute other words for the words of a statute and the good reason for this was that few words have exact synonyms.
The House of Lords rejected the Divisional Court's interpretation of the word. In disagreeing with the conclusion reached in the Divisional Court, the judgment in the case makes reference to the difficulties facing Parliament in trying to resolve to what extent freedom of speech or behaviour should be limited in the general public interest. The House of Lords concluded that vigorous speech and behaviour is permitted, even though it may be distasteful and unmannerly, provided it does not breach the limits imposed by section 5; i.e. it must not be threatening, must not be abusive and must not be insulting. The court concluded that "an ordinary sensible man knows an insult when he sees or hears it" and on this basis, the Divisional Court was wrong to interfere with the decision of the magistrates. The judgment in the case records that the spectators may have been angry and justly so and the uncomplicated conduct was deplorable and probably ought to be punishable, but he failed to see how it 'insulted' the spectators.
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, in dismissing the need for definition of the word 'insulting' stated that the words of the section convey a meaning of a word in general use which the ordinary citizen can well understand. He underlined the dangers of ascribing meanings to ordinary words, by pointing out that insulting behaviour will often show disrespect or contempt for peoples' rights; but it does not follow that whenever there is disrespect or contempt for people's rights there must always be insulting behaviour.
In his judgment, Lord Kilbrandon stated that he did not find the quotation of dictionary definitions helpful. "'Insulting' is an ordinary uncomplicated English word" he said and went on to summarise the difficulties of attempting, as the Divisional Court had done, to give meanings to ordinary words by a quotation from Boswell -
"To explain, requires the use of terms less abstruse than that which is to be explained, and such terms cannot always be found. The easiest word, whatever it may be, can never be translated into one more easy".
In allowing Brutus' appeal against the Divisional Court's decision, the House of Lords held that behaviour which affronted other people or evidenced a disrespect of their rights so as to give rise to resentment or protest on their part was not necessarily insulting behaviour, that the word "insulting" was to be given its ordinary meaning and whether behaviour had been insulting was a question of fact for the magistrates to decide.
So far as the word 'abusive' in the Public Order Act offences is concerned, in R v Evans (Dorothy) (2004), the Court of Appeal ruled that, in determining whether a restraining order under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 has been breached, following the principles laid down in Brutus v Cozens, ruled that whether something was 'abusive' was a question of fact and not law and was to be given the meaning attributed to it in ordinary usage.
View the full Legal Q&A document here, with links to related and similar legal questions.
For quick and easy access in the future, click the pin icon from the top right of any document to save it to 'My Documents'.
