R (on the application of Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2026
Update - Since the case of R (on the application of Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2026, there has been a further appeal from the Secretary of State on 15 June 2026.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Home Secretary's appeal and set aside the Administrative Court's decision to quash the proscription of Palestine Action under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. They determined that the proscription of Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000 was lawful.
The original judgement will remain on PNLD but the new judgement will be added to the database in due course.
Palestine Action was founded in 2020 as a direct action protest group targeting companies facilitating Israel's arms trade in Britain, particularly Elbit Systems UK Limited.
Palestine Action undertook 385 direct actions since 2020, including criminal damage, spray painting, and property destruction.
Three incidents were assessed as terrorism under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000: Thales Glasgow (June 2022), Instro Precision Kent (June 2024), and Elbit Bristol (August 2024), involving serious property damage exceeding millions of pounds.
Palestine Action published an Underground Manual in late 2023 encouraging formation of cells, providing guidance on damaging property, and advocating destruction of targets.
Following the RAF Brize Norton incident on 20 June 2025, the Home Secretary decided on 20 June 2025 to proscribe Palestine Action and announced this to Parliament on 23 June 2025.
The Proscription Review Group met on 13 March 2025, concluding that discretionary considerations favoured proscription.
The Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025 was laid before Parliament on 30 June 2025, approved by both Houses, made on 4 July 2025, and came into force on 5 July 2025 which added the names of three organisations to the list of proscribed organisations at Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (the 2000 Act). One of those organisations was Palestine Action.
The claimant, AM, a co-founder of Palestine Action, filed judicial review proceedings on 27 June 2025 challenging the proscription decision. Permission was granted on four grounds by Chamberlain J and the Court of Appeal (Civil Division).
AM submitted that:
Before laying the Order in Parliament the Home Secretary was required at common law to consult Palestine Action on her proposed decision (Ground 8).
The Home Secretary failed to have regard to relevant considerations including that Palestine Action sought to prevent conduct constituting facilitation of genocide and violations of international law, and the adequacy of alternative criminal and civil measures (Ground 5).
The Home Secretary failed to apply her own policy requiring proportionality assessment because she relied improperly on operational benefits of proscription (Ground 6).
The proscription decision was contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998 as it amounted to unjustified interference with articles 10 and 11 rights to freedom of expression and association, and constituted discrimination contrary to article 14 (Ground 2).
Held
Appeal allowed.
The court allowed AM's judicial review claim to the extent that Grounds 5 and 8 were dismissed but AM succeeded on Grounds 6 and 2. Subject to any further representations on relief, the court proposed to make an order quashing the Home Secretary's decision to proscribe Palestine Action and the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025 adding Palestine Action to the list of proscribed organisations. The court declined to refuse relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 as it could not be said to be highly likely that the same decision would have been reached absent the significant error in applying the policy.
On Ground 8, the power to proscribe an organisation rested on the Home Secretary's belief that it was concerned in terrorism and was, self-evidently, a power that engaged the Home Secretary's responsibility to safeguard national security. By the time the obligation to give prior notice and seek representations arose the Home Secretary would already have formed a reasonable belief that the organisation to be consulted was an organisation concerned in terrorism. Consultation with such an organisation was not an obvious or natural step; considerations might arise, such as the nature and extent of communication that would be consistent with the public interest, and the organisation might react to advance notice of proscription which could bring forward activity that might be frustrated by proscription.
On Ground 5, the Home Secretary was well aware of the reasons Palestine Action relied on as justifying its campaign of direct action including damage to property. The remaining parts of the ground repeated arguments made in support of Ground 6 and Ground 2 of the challenge.
On Ground 6, the Home Secretary's policy required assessment of whether proscription was proportionate by weighing the organisation's characteristics and consideration of foreign policy against consequences of proscription. The policy was an additional qualitative threshold to use the power to proscribe. The Home Secretary had latitude to decide for herself which matters were appropriate “other factors”. However, the power to choose them must be used consistently with the usual Wednesbury principles, including that such “other factors” chosen must be consistent with the purpose of the policy, which was to limit use of the discretionary power to proscribe. The operational consequences and advantages of proscription was not a factor consistent with the policy for the obvious reason that such consequences and advantages would apply equally to any organisation that could be proscribed, and therefore the Home Secretary's decision to proscribe Palestine Action was not consistent with her policy.
On Ground 2, the interference was not prescribed by law because the Home Secretary failed to apply her policy. That conclusion, without more, had the effect that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was in breach of section 6 of the 1998 Act. Even if prescribed by law, proscription caused very significant interference with articles 10 and 11 ECHR rights. Whilst Palestine Action committed three terrorist acts and its Underground Manual promoted violence, the nature and scale of terrorist activities had not reached the level justifying proscription's severe consequences, particularly given availability of ordinary criminal law with significant penalties.
The decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action was an organisation that promoted its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act. For those actions, regardless of proscription, the criminal law was available to prosecute those concerned. If convicted they face the prospect of significant punishment, which would serve as a significant deterrent to others.
Reproduced with permission of Reed Elsevier (UK) Limited, trading as LexisNexis.
View the full case document here, with links to related legislation and similar cases.
