Written by: Christopher Smith, PNLD's Traffic Law Consultant
Not reviewed after the date of publication - 25 March 2025
The legal duty to provide information as to the driver of a vehicle, arises under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, section 112 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and section 46 of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994. This article, written by PNLD’s traffic law consultant, Christopher Smith, outlines the key points and relevant caselaw relating to section 172.
Who does it apply to?
Section 172(2) requires that, where the driver of a vehicle (whether a motor vehicle or not) is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which the section applies:
‘(a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or on behalf of a Chief Officer of Police; and
(b) any other person shall if required as stated above give any information which it is in his power to give and may lead to the identification of the driver.’
Which offences does it relate to?
Section 172(1) provides that the section extends to any offence under the 1988 Act, other than offences under Part 5 (Driving Instruction) and sections 13 (Regulation of motoring events on public ways), 16 (Wearing of protective headgear), 51(2) (Testing of goods vehicles), 61(4) (Regulations for the issue of type approval certificates and related matters), 67(9) (Obstruction of authorised examiner), 68(4) (Requirement to proceed to a place of vehicle inspection), 96 (Uncorrected eyesight), and 120 (Licensing of drivers of LGVs/PCVs). It also extends to offences against any other enactment relating to the use of vehicles on roads and to any offence under section 25 (Information as to date of birth and sex), 26 (Interim disqualification), and 27 (Production of licence) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
Section 172(1)(c) states the section applies to:
‘any offence under any other enactment relating to the use of vehicles on roads…’
So, does this mean that if a vehicle was seen to be involved in a high value theft (the vehicle was used to transport stolen items), then section 172 would apply? In our opinion and CPS’, the answer to this is ‘no’; it can’t be used in these circumstances, as it doesn’t relate to the ‘use’ of the vehicle on the road. Of course, this assumes the driver isn’t committing any of the other offences to which section 172 does apply.
Section 172(2) generally extends to offences under regulations made under any provisions of the 1988 Act mentioned in section 172(1) – Bingham v Bruce [1962] 1 All ER 136 (driver parked contrary to regulations made under section 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1960) and Rathbone v Bundock [1962] 2 All ER 257 (offence of unnecessary obstruction contrary to the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1955).
Recent change in ownership
The requirement in relation to section 172 applies to the person keeping the vehicle. In Hateley v Greenough [1962] Crim LR 329 [PNLD ref: C100305] a person who, although not the owner of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence, was the owner when he was requested under section 172(2)(a) to give information, was held to be the owner for the purposes of that paragraph.
‘Any other person’
In section 172(2)(b), the words 'any other person’ include the driver - Bingham v Bruce [1962] 1 WLR 70.
A doctor claiming that information was confidential can also fall within the description. In Hunter v Mann [1974] RTR 338 [PNLD ref: C4335], a doctor had information which may have led to the identification of the driver of a stolen car, who was alleged to be guilty of dangerous driving. A police officer, acting under section 168(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 asked the doctor to give the information. He refused on the grounds that the information had been obtained solely through the relationship of doctor and patient and to divulge it would be a breach of professional confidence and the code of conduct. He was convicted of contravening section 168(3) and so appealed. The court held that the appeal would be dismissed, for a doctor acting within his professional capacity and carrying out his professional duty and responsibility was within the words ‘any other person’ in section 168(2)(b), and the defendant undoubtedly had the ‘power’ to disclose the information, and, accordingly, had been correctly convicted.
Police authority and issuing the requirement
When the police require information under section 172, they are not bound to state the nature of the alleged offence – Pulton v Leader [1949] 2 All ER 747. In Mohindra v DPP [2004] EWHC 490 (Admin), the court concluded that section 172(3) only creates one offence i.e. failing to comply with the requirement of giving information relating to the identity of the driver alleged to have been guilty of the offence. Therefore, the information need do no more than allege the failure to give information, identify the particulars of the vehicle, the date of the failure and refer to section 172(3) and Schedule 2 of the 1988 Act. Additionally, to be guilty of the offence under section 172(3), the defendant does not need to be aware that they are under an obligation to give the information – Whiteside v DPP [2011] EWHC 3471 (Admin).
In Duncan v MacGillivray, 1989 SLT 48 (a Scottish case), an accused person was charged with a contravention of section 6(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 (Driving, or being in charge, with blood-alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit). During the trial, objection was taken to evidence of a reply which the accused had made to a question put to him by a police officer. The police officer held the authority of the Chief Constable to require the accused to provide information as to the identity of the driver of the vehicle in terms of section 168(2) of the 1972 Act (Duty to give information as to identity of driver, etc. in certain cases). The accused was asked ‘Have you been driving that vehicle?’ and he replied ‘yes’. The sheriff rejected the objection and convicted the accused. The accused appealed on the ground that the evidence of the reply was inadmissible because the question asked did not constitute the making of a requirement within the meaning of section 168(2). The court held that there was nothing in the language of section 168(2) RTA 1972 compelling the use of any particular form of words by a police officer holding authority which entitled him to demand the information and accordingly the evidence of the accused's reply to the question was admissible and the appeal was refused. However, it was observed that if the police officer merely asked the question and there was a refusal to answer it, the police officer would have to explain that failure to answer is an offence, and put the question again.
In Osgerby v Walden [1967] Crim. LR 301, the court ruled that the prosecution must prove that the person asking the question was acting on behalf of a Chief Officer of Police. In Arnold v DPP [1999] RTR 99, the court ruled that in view of the developments in computer technology, it was not reasonable to expect every notice issued by the Central Ticket Office pursuant to section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to be signed by the specifically authorised person. A notice with a printed inscription relating to the sender of the notice and stating that he/she was acting on behalf of the Chief Constable was satisfactory – it was unnecessary for the notice to state the sender was authorised by the Chief Constable.
Failure to respond
In Francis v DPP [2004] EWHC 591 (Admin), Mr Francis appealed against a conviction for failing to provide information as to the identity of the driver of a motor vehicle, contrary to s.172 RTA 1988. The main facts of the case we’re that Mr Francis:
- was the registered keeper of a Jaguar car found by camera to be travelling at 41 mph in a 30 mph zone;
- returned a form and notice of intended prosecution sent to him by police but whilst he’d added his driver number and correctly dated the form, he hadn’t signed it;
- said he’d taken legal advice and had supplied sufficient information for the purposes of s.172.
On appeal, he asserted:
- his signature wasn’t an express requirement under s.172; and argued
- that because the police had reason to believe he was driving at the time, the form should have included a caution to comply with PACE Code C, Part 10 (Cautions).
Dismissing the appeal, the court held:
- The police could require information to be required in written form under the s.172(2) and (7) RTA 1988, and in such cases the signature of the vehicle's keeper was a reasonable form of response that could be required by the police. This form of authentication was usual in the circumstances and the intention of Parliament could be inferred on this matter from section 12 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
- PACE Code C, Part 10 did not apply because the answers sought from Mr Francis on the form were not being used for any purpose other than police enquiries.
In Marshall v Crown Prosecutions Service [2015] EWHC 2333 (Admin) [PNLD ref: C3308], a man and wife asserted that they couldn't identify who was driving their car at the time it activated a static speed camera. The court held that a conscientious inquiry by the appellant could have identified the driver – Mrs Marshall's conviction under section 172(3) was upheld.
In Lowe v Lester [1987] RTR 30, a driver parked it in a pay and display car park without displaying a ticket. When the excess charge wasn’t paid, a notice under s.85(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Regulations Act 1967 was sent to him requiring him to give the identity of the driver within 14 days – this he didn’t do. Three months later when charged with the offence under s.85(3), he provided the information but argued that as the Act didn’t give a time limit, no offence was committed – he was convicted. The court held that the information has to be provided forthwith or within a reasonable time and the justices had rightly regarded 14 days as such a reasonable time.
Although the information must be provided, it doesn’t have to be provided on the form sent out by the police. In Jones v DPP [2004] RTR 331, the accused returned the police form uncompleted but accompanied by a signed letter giving all the information required and this was accepted.
Body Corporates
Section 172(5) provides that where a body corporate is guilty of an offence under section 172 and the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to neglect on the part of, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he/she, as well as the body corporate, is guilty of that offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Self-incrimination
In DPP v Wilson [2001] EWHC Admin 198 the court held that the use in evidence of an admission by the defendant, obtained in response to a notice served under s.172(2)(b) RTA 1988, that he was the driver of a vehicle at the time of a road traffic offence did not infringe his right to a fair trial or his right not to incriminate himself.
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