DPP v Price and another 2024
Police were called to a residence occupied by P and D due to a report that a male at the property had smashed up the kitchen. The report was made by D’s mother who was not present at the address but had spoken to her daughter on the phone.
Upon attendance, officers noted D had been crying, but she informed them everything was fine and asked the officers to leave, stating they would antagonise the situation. D shouted at the officers and held the door handle to prevent officers entering. When officers looked through a window of the property, they witnessed P attempting to lock the door from the inside and D encouraging him to do so. D initially stated to officers that P had "smashed the kitchen up" but retracted this and went on to say that herself and P had caused the damage together.
Officers forced entry under section 17(1)(b) of PACE based on reasonable suspicion of criminal damage contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 due to the report from D’s mother, the fact that D confirmed damage had been caused and the fact the officers themselves had seen the damage themselves when looking through the window.
The incident and attempts to prevent officers entering the property resulted in P being charged with two offences namely, assaulting an emergency worker, pursuant to section 1 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 and section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 along with a secondary charge of intent to resist arrest, contrary to section 38 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. D was also charged with assaulting an emergency worker.
During deliberations, the District Judge questioned the evidence, focussing on whether the information available to officers and events upon attendance were sufficient justification to evidence criminal damage. In the absence of witness evidence, the Judge stated that damage does not automatically become criminal damage concluding that criminal damage is only caused where there has been a complaint and at no point in this case, had a complaint been made by anyone. The judge ultimately concluded that as there was no evidence of criminal there had been no offence to arrest for, meaning the officers had not had any right to use force to enter the property. It therefore followed that the officers were not acting in their functions as emergency workers at the material time and so the charges were dismissed by the Judge based on being no case to answer.
The matter was referred to the Kings Bench Division by the prosecution, on appeal by way of case stated. The question to be asked during appeal by way of case stated was formulated by the District Judge as:
“Was I correct to conclude that in the absence of a formal complaint of criminal damage by the female defendant, D, at that time that the police were acting outside of their functions as emergency workers in entering the property to arrest P?”
Held
Appeal allowed, matter remitted for determination.
The Kings Bench Division determined that it also must be decided firstly whether the District Judge adopted the correct approach when determining the officers had not been entitled to enter the property to arrest and secondly, whether the District Judges determination that officers were not acting in the exercise of their functions as emergency workers had also been correct.
In the context of the case, the District Judge was required to consider four questions to determine the legality of entering the property for arrest namely, whether an indictable offence had been committed (required under section 17(1)(b)) and if so, whether there had been reasonable grounds for that suspicion. Thirdly, whether for any of the reasons mentioned in section 24(5) of PACE it had been necessary to use force to enter the property for the purpose of arrest and finally, whether there had been reasonable grounds for necessary belief. On proper reading of the case, it was not in dispute that the District Judge had asked himself those questions, but the actual assessment of the Judge was called into question.
Turning to the District Judges actual assessment of lawfulness of entry to the property by the officers, the key question was whether the officers had reasonable suspicion of an offence having been committed and in determining this, the Judge had looked for objective evidence to make a determination. The Court concluded this was the incorrect test, as the judge was applying the test of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of criminal damage and was approaching the matter on the footing that unless an offence of criminal damage had been established, at least on the prima facie basis, the entry was unlawful.
The District Judge had looked to see whether there was evidence of the offence of criminal damage and that, having concluded there was no evidence which would establish that, determined that there was no need for an arrest. It followed that the Judge had applied the wrong legal approach when determining lawfulness of arrest and entry.
There can be reasonable suspicion of criminal damage for the purpose of arrest without being a prima facie case of criminal damage. The lack of complaint was not fatal to arrest occurring. Considering that, the Court stated that had the correct test been applied, the outcome of the case may have been different, and charges not dismissed. At the very least, there would have been scope for a court to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion based on: the fact of the initial call; the emotional state of D; the aggression shown by P and his actions; the damage seen; the comment from D that her kitchen had been smashed up; and the circumstances of the retraction of that comment. It follows that dismissal of the charges would not have been an inevitable consequence of the application of the correct test.
As the District Judge's conclusion as to whether the officers were exercising the functions of emergency workers was based on his views regarding lawfulness of the entry, the appeal must succeed.
It is not a precondition of an emergency worker acting in the exercise of their functions that they must be acting lawfully. Despite that, for completeness the Kings Bench Division addressed the approach of the District Judge in considering the offence of assaulting an emergency worker again, concluding again that the incorrect approach had been adopted.
It was not necessary for an officer to be acting lawfully for the offence of assaulting an emergency worker to be made out. Case law (see DPP v Ahmed and Campbell v CPS) has established that the offence may be committed against an officer acting outside of their functions. Whilst lawfulness is relevant to the question of whether an officer is acting in their functions as an emergency worker, the District Judge determined that his conclusion on lawfulness of the arrest and entry as being determinative to the fact that the officers weren’t acting in their functions as emergency workers, which was incorrect.
View the full DPP v Price and another 2024 case document here, with links to related legislation and similar cases.
