R v Webb and another 2025
S1 and S2 were married. S2 was a vulnerable adult suffering from cerebral palsy - needing substantial physical care and assistance. W was employed as his carer. W and S1 were alleged by the prosecution to have coerced and controlled S2 - separating him from his family with evidence showing he was effectively imprisoned for around two and a half years, confined to his bed often without care and in unsanitary conditions, with limited autonomy. The prosecution advanced that even though S2 had not given W and S1 work, they coerced him into allowing W to keep his caring job and income even though W was neglecting his caring responsibilities. In doing so, S2 was made to report W was doing a good job to the carer's agency and Social Services. S2 provided a home and resources to W and S1 – allowing them to use his income to support their lifestyle. However, S2 was unaware W and S1 were engaged in an affair which had been masked by their coercion. Text messages between W and S1 showed they planned to save up money and leave S2. The situation was highlighted by a friend who contacted S2 by video call and was subsequently shocked by his condition.
During proceedings, the judge had defined the following terms:
Servitude as "one person's obligation to provide services to another, an obligation that is imposed by the use of coercion". It follows, the judge directed the jury that, although S2 did not provide W or, S1 any work or service it could amount to servitude if his actions provided a benefit for them and they coerced the victim to do that.
Slavery as "treating someone as belonging to oneself by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or object". It follows, the judge recognised the charge alleged holding the victim in slavery "or" servitude. Consequently, he gave the jury a direction in accordance with R v Brown (Kevin) (1984) 1 B.C.C. 98970, [1983] 12 WLUK 32. The “Brown direction” relates to jury unanimity on different aspects of an offence in that, in the present case to convict, the jury had to be sure the conditions S2 had been kept under amounted to slavery, and/or that they amounted to servitude.
Although W and S1 denied any mistreatment, they were convicted on count one of the offence of holding a person in slavery or servitude contrary to section1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and other offences including ill-treatment by a care worker contrary to section 20 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
They appealed with leave against their convictions on the following grounds:
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They argued no evidence existed to show S1 had been held in slavery or servitude.
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The judge's directions to the jury in relation to slavery or servitude were incorrect.
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Duplicity arose in that slavery and servitude should have been separated into two counts for the purpose of count one.
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They contended the definitions of "slavery" and “servitude” where no work or function was performed by the person said to have been kept in slavery or servitude.
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The judge's adopted definition of slavery did not clarify that it involves the deprivation of personal autonomy.
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They evidence presented did not prove a deprivation of autonomy rather than a restriction of it.
Held
Appeals allowed. Convictions quashed in part.
The court's definition of servitude required the provision of work or services under coercion. Given S2 had not provided services or work to W or S1 there was no basis on which the jury could find he had been held in servitude. It follows, the judge's directions gave rise to the possibility the jury had convicted on the grounds they were not satisfied slavery existed, but were sure servitude existed. Accordingly, the judge’s comments were a misdirection. The judge erred by relying on section 3 of the 2015 Act to broaden the definition of servitude to include the provision of "benefits," an interpretation unsupported by legislation.
The court determined section 1(1)(a) creates a single offence that can be carried out through either slavery or servitude which are very similar and often indistinguishable ways. It does not create two separate offences. However, because this specific case lacked evidence of servitude, the jury’s deliberations should have focused on slavery.
Reference had been made to the "classic definition" of slavery from past authority which, considered powers attaching to the right of ownership. This was deemed problematic because there is no right to legally own another person. It follows, slavery can be considered as the domination of another person's life so that they are deprived of any real personal autonomy. The judge's direction about slavery was inadequate as it drew the jury's attention to how one might treat an "animal or object" rather than focussing on the effect on the victim's personal autonomy and freedom. Consequently, the court suggested better ways of directing juries on the meaning of slavery, emphasizing the deprivation of free will and personal autonomy when applying this to the specific facts of a case.
Having considered the evidence, the court concluded that evidence did exist which a jury, if properly directed (in relation to slavery and servitude) could have concluded S2 had been held in slavery. However, that evidence was not so overwhelming the conviction could said to be safe despite the judge's misdirection.
Having concluded section 1(1)(a) of the 2015 Act creates a single offence which could be committed in different ways, no question of duplicity arose as suggested by the appeal grounds. The duplicity argument added nothing of substance to the decision they have already taken about the decision to leave it open to the jury to convict on the basis that the conduct of the W and S1 did not amount to holding S2 in slavery but did amount to holding him in servitude. It would not, without that substantial problem, justify quashing the conviction on its own.
Consequently, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against conviction on count one - quashing those convictions. It rejected an application for a retrial on count one because the interests of justice did not require it as W and S1 had been convicted and substantially sentenced for the offending alleged against them within the other counts.
