R v Sheikh and others 2025
S1 was a “vulnerable adult” due to her limited command of the English language, her lack of financial independence, her inability to protect herself from the hostile environment within her husband's family home, and her isolation from the wider community.
S1 was found in a persistent vegetative state after ingesting the anti-diabetic drug, glimepiride. Prior to this, S1 had suffered a caustic burn to her lower back, inflicted by either S2, S3, S4 or S5. The appellants were members of S1’s household and were aware of the caustic burn injury. There was evidence that they delayed seeking medical assistance and concealed the circumstances of S1’s lapse into unconsciousness. S2, S3, S4 and S5 were convicted of causing or allowing serious physical harm to a vulnerable adult under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (DVCVA).
Grounds of appeal:
- Section 5(1)(d)(i) of DVCVA must be strictly construed to mean that the defendant (“D”), who was not the perpetrator of the unlawful act referred to in section 5(1)(c) must be proved to have been, or ought to have been, aware of the significant risk of such harm being caused to the victim (“V”) by the unlawful act which resulted in V's death or serious harm. That is, the definite article 'the' and the parsing of section 5(1)(c) which associates the significant risk with the unlawful act. If non-perpetrator D was or should have been aware of the risk of serious harm created by a physical assault, then regardless of how a subsequent physical assault which led to serious physical harm was occasioned, whether by fist, or feet or 'conventional' weapon and whatever the manner in which it was carried out, whether by blow, or incision or smothering, section 5(1)(d)(i) would be satisfied. However, if the unlawful act was committed by any other means, for example by the administration of a noxious substance or gross neglect, then this would not incriminate a non-perpetrating D pursuant to section 5 of the DVCVA, for the risk created by that type of unlawful act was not reasonably foreseeable.
- Should ground 1 not be satisfied, it is submitted that whilst there was evidence upon which the jury would be entitled to conclude that S1 had been unlawfully assaulted to cause the caustic burn to her back, and that S2, S3, S4 and S5 were aware of the same, the subsequent ingestion of glimepiride, was of such a different character to the physical assault that it could not reasonably have been in the their contemplation to lead them to take steps to protect S1 from such harm for it did not occur in 'circumstances of the kind' that were reasonably foreseeable under section 5(1)(d)(iii) of that Act.
Held
Appeal allowed. Conviction overturned.
The court rejected the appellants' argument on the construction of section 5(1)(d)(i), finding that section 5(1) defines the offence and, read in its entirety as is clearly intended, it indicates the scope of principal and secondary liability. It is subsection 1(d)(iii) which delineates a non-perpetrating D's culpability by reference to the 'circumstances' in which the risk has been realised, and whether it is 'of a kind'. The emphasis in section 5(1)(d)(i) is upon the reasonable foreseeability of the risk of further serious physical harm, or death, being occasioned to V, based upon the fact of previous unlawful conduct by a member of the same household.
However, 'circumstances of the kind' will not necessarily encapsulate all and any serious harm caused or inflicted by any unlawful means if it occurs within the domestic setting. If this was to happen, section 5(1)(d)(iii) would become otiose, for by this stage of their deliberations the jury will already have determined that the unlawful act has occurred to a vulnerable victim by a member of D's household and so, within a domestic setting.
The offence contrary to section 5 of the DVACA must not be so widely interpreted as to undermine the safeguards in section 5(1)(d)(iii), all of which must be given due weight. ‘The circumstances’ must not be interpreted too loosely, it will be a matter for the jury, or the judge on a submission of no case to answer, to have regard to all the evidence and all the circumstances.
In these circumstances section 5(1)(d)(iii) was too broadly interpreted. The judge should have specifically addressed the question of intent in the administration of a noxious substance on the basis that the jury did find one of the appellants to have administered the glimepiride by reference to the expert evidence and also that even if they were sure that glimepiride had been administered with the requisite intent that they should not necessarily find that it was “in the circumstances of the kind that D foresaw or ought to have foreseen” only because it had occurred within the domestic setting.
View the full case document here, with links to related legislation and similar cases.
