R v Malik 2025
On 2 June 2020 at approximately 00:30, the complainant, aged 18, was walking by Richmond riverside having drunk a bottle of wine and taken medication. M, a stranger, followed the complainant and sat next to her on a bench. M told the complainant he had followed her because she had a nice arse, made sexually explicit comments about his penis and being horny, and mentioned he had smashed up his kitchen and talked about getting a gun. The complainant performed oral sex on M at a first bench location after he asked her to do so. They walked together to a second bench where the complainant again performed oral sex and then M had vaginal intercourse with her after she removed her clothing. The complainant stated she had told M she was not there for sex and that she wanted to go home.
The complainant called a friend asking him to pretend to be her brother and summon her home, then ordered an Uber at 3:04 am. Upon arriving home, the complainant told her brother, sister and friend that a male had intimidated her into having sex and reported to police that she had been raped.
M was arrested and provided a prepared statement denying rape and asserting the sexual activity was consensual. M was convicted of three counts of rape contrary to section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on 24 October 2024 and sentenced on 3 October 2025 to a hospital order with restrictions.
M appealed against conviction with leave of the single judge on the single ground that the convictions were unsafe because the trial judge should have acceded to the defence submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution evidence. M argued that whilst there was sufficient evidence that the complainant had not consented, under the second limb of Galbraith "the prosecution evidence regarding consent and belief in consent was so weak and tenuous that no jury properly directed could safely convict". M contended that the complainant's evidence showed willing participation or at minimum acquiescence, including responding "Oh, wow" to sexual comments, allowing physical contact, and the CCTV showing willing participation in walking with the M's arm around her and embracing whilst waiting for the Uber. M pointed to absence of evidence that the complainant said no or indicated resistance, and when the complainant had resisted regarding potential anal penetration, M immediately desisted.
Held
Appeal dismissed.
The Court was entirely satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to go before the jury on the issue of reasonable belief in consent.
The Court identified numerous factors known to M, including that the complainant was a young woman aged 18, alone, drunk and upset at night in a dark isolated location; that she had walked fast away from him; that he had followed her and made sexually aggressive comments; that she had stated she was not there for sex; and that she had told him she wanted to go home. The Court concluded these matters provided more than sufficient evidence for the jury to assess reasonable belief in consent, notwithstanding strong defence points which were properly matters for the jury.
The appeal was dismissed and the conviction deemed safe.
Reproduced with permission of Reed Elsevier (UK) Limited, trading as LexisNexis.
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